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ABSTRACT
Virtual machine level record and replay can be used for complex system de-
bugging and analysis, fault-tolerance replication and forensic analysis. Pre-
vious work on performance evaluation of RnR frameworks are not complete
enough due to their narrow focuses. RnR related projects either focus on
performance evaluation of plain record and replay mechanisms or specifically
target the effectiveness of the functionality RnR supports.
In order to identify the performance bottlenecks in the complicated RnR
system and its various applications, this thesis conducts a thorough evalua-
tion and analysis on 3 different modes of RnR, that is, record, replay with
checkpointing and replay with VMI analysis. Both RnR system developer
and users can benefit from our work. With our evaluation results, system
developer can propose more efficient design accordingly, and RnR users can
configure the system properly to achieve expected performance.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Virtual machine level deterministic record and replay has been well studied
in the past decade. A number of complete implementations [1, 2, 3] of de-
terministic replay systems are available for different production platforms.
Moreover, numerous applications of RnR have been suggested for complex
system debugging and analysis [4, 5, 6, 7, 8], fault-tolerant replication [9, 10],
security and forensic analysis [11, 1, 12, 13, 14], etc. However, despite flour-
ishing study in academia, we haven’t seen deterministic RnR be incorporated
in current production virtualization systems or software stacks. There are
various reasons for it, and performance overhead is one of them.
Previous work on performance evaluation of RnR frameworks and applica-
tions is not complete enough. Different projects have different focuses. RnR
design paper conducts evaluation for plain record and replay execution over-
head, while evaluation in RnR application paper focuses on effectiveness and
robustness of the targeted functionality. Despite the existence of abundant
research results, we find it still difficult to obtain a complete view of the
complicated RnR system and identify performance bottlenecks within the
framework and its different applications.
After surveying a large number of RnR application projects, we summarize
the usages of RnR in two categories as follows. First, checkpointing mech-
anism is commonly used together with RnR to either support fault-tolerant
replication or provide initial consistent system state for debugging. Second,
various VMI analysis techniques are applied at replay stage, to monitor sys-
tem execution or conduct forensic analysis.
In this thesis, we carry out a thorough analysis and evaluation on a virtual
machine level record and replay framework, as well as its two major appli-
cations, i.e. replay with checkpointing and replay with VMI analysis. Our
work is useful from two perspectives. On one hand, with the major sources
of overhead being identified, developers can accordingly propose more effi-
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cient design. On the other hand, with a detailed performance analysis, RnR
users can have a more reasonable performance expectations, and customize
applications to achieve better performance.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Virtualization
Over the last two decades, thanks to the rapid developing virtualization
techniques, data centers have turned into multi-tennant, dynamically provi-
sionable resources, and cloud computing has been widely adopted.
The concept of virtualization is not new, which can be dated back to
late 1960s, when IBM developed the first system to support concurrent and
interactive access to a mainframe computer. Modern virtualization indicates
techniques that enable multiple operating environments execute on the same
hardware at the same time. In this section, we briefly discuss two main
types of virtual machine monitors and several commonly used virtualization
techniques.
2.1.1 Types of virtual machine monitor
A virtual machine(VM) is an software abstract of physical machine. An
operating system can be installed in the virtual machine and executes as if it
runs on a physical machine. Such operating system is called as “Guest OS”.
The software layer that provides the interface between virtual machine and
underlying hardware is called virtual machine monitor(VMM) or hypervisor.
There are two major types of virtual machine monitors, named as type 1 and
type 2 according to [15].
Figure 2.1 shows different architecture of the two types of VMM. Type
1 VMM, also named as native or bare-metal hypervisor, runs directly on
host hardware. The hypervisor self can be considered as a specialized op-
erating system, which is able to manage CPU, memory, devices, etc. and
provide interface for virtual machine. Example of type 1 VMM includes
3
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Figure 2.1: Types of Virtual Machine Monitor
Xen [16], VMWare ESX and Microsoft Hyper-V [17]. Type 2 VMM, also
named as hosted hypervisor, runs on conventional operating system as a
normal process, and leverages the host operating system to interact with un-
derlying hardware. Type 2 systems include VMWare Workstation, Virtual
Box, QEMU [18].
2.1.2 Hardware-assisted Virtualization
Full virtualization is used to emulate a complete hardware environment for
virtual machine, so that unmodified operating system can execute in com-
plete isolation. It can be implemented via binary translation and soft-
ware emulation of devices, which suffer significant performance overhead.
Hardware-assisted virtualization, also called accelerated virtualization, is a
platform virtualization approach to enable efficient full virtualization with
the help of extended hardware capabilities. In 2005 and 2006, Intel and
AMD introduces new processor extensions to support hardware virtualiza-
tion, named as Intel VT-x and AMD-V, which simplified virtualization soft-
ware design but offered little speed benefit. Later more features are added
to improve memory management virtualization and IO virtualization via ex-
tented page table(EPT) and virtualized IO.
One of the difficult in vitalization for x86 system is that, certain privi-
leged instructions can not be directly executed in guest system. Hardware
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Figure 2.2: Intel VTx Technology: VMX Mode Transition
assisted virtualization techniques adds extra modes to processors to avoid de-
privileging rings for guest OS, Taking Intel VT-x for example, the processor
supports two kinds of operations: VMX root operation and VMX non-root
operation. In general, VMM executes in root operation, and guest software
runs in non-root operation. Privileged instructions in VMX non-root oper-
ation will be trapped into VMM. Transition between VMX root operation
and VMX non-root is presented in Figure 2.2. Transition from VMX root
operation to non-root is called VMEntry, while the reverse transition is called
VMExit.
2.2 Virtual Machine Introspection
Virtual machine introspection (VMI) is a technique to enable monitoring
guest virtual machine state at hypervisor layer. It is first proposed by
Garfinkel and Rosenblum [19] as a hypervisor-level Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem (IDS). VMI is considered a promising introspecting technique to ensure
security policy enforcement within the untrustworthy operating system for
two reasons. First, the smaller code base of hypervisor makes it a smaller
attack surface compared to extremely complex monolithic operating system.
Second, by operating at a higher privilege level, the hypervisor is isolated
and decoupled from the untrusted guest virtual machine. VMI has become
a relatively mature research topic, with numerous projects.
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However, without OS abstraction and higher level semantics, the hyper-
visor views the guest memory as raw bits or bytes. This problem is known
as “semantic gap” Various techniques have been proposed to “bridge the
semantic gap” by reconstructing guest operating system data structures.
VMI techniques can be divided into two categories depending on whether
it is triggered by interposition. Passive VMI techniques relies on polling
VM state for information with whitelisting or blacklisting. Examples of this
type of VMI include libvmi [20] and VIX [21]. Active VMI revolves around
monitoring checks triggered by certain events (usually in hardware), such as
specific hardware registers or memory regions being accessed. For instance,
Hypertap/Hprobes [22], Livewire [19], Lares [23], SIM [24], Antfarm [25],
Lycosid [26] are commonly used ones.
2.3 Record and Replay
Record and deterministic Replay (RnR) of workloads is a popular architec-
tural technique [27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 1, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42,
43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 8, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 14, 60]. As
a workload runs, RnR records all the non-deterministic events that can af-
fect the execution and stores them in a log (Record). Later, in a potentially
different platform, the workload is re-executed. At this time, the system
injects the recorded events at the correct times, enforcing a deterministic
execution (Replay). Recent proposals for RnR typically consider two classes
of non-deterministic events: inputs to the workload and the memory-access
interleaving of parallel processors.
RnR can be done at different abstraction layes—e.g., program-level RnR
records and replays one or more programs in isolation, while VM-level RnR
records and replays an entire VM. In this work, we use VM-level RnR [29,
32, 1, 33, 37]. Moreover, we consider uniprocessor hardware. As a result, the
only relevant sources of non-determinism comprise interrupts raised and data
copied by virtual devices into the guest machine. We also assume the widely
used model of hypervisor-mediated I/O, as used in Xen [16] or Qemu [18].
In this case, the hypervisor interposes on all the I/O operations of the guest.
This makes it possible to implement input recording in the hypervisor and
use software-only mechanisms for recording. On the other hand, if the VM
6
directly interacted with the hardware (using recent virtualization technolo-
gies such as Intel VT-d [61]), input recording would require hardware support
similar to hardware-assisted RnR (e.g., FDR [54] and DeLorean [41]).
Almost all research papers on RnR list security as one of its principal
use-cases, but there are only a few that investigate use of RnR in a security-
related scenario [1, 11, 13, 32, 14, 60]. ReVirt [1] shows an example of using
VM-level RnR for post-facto oﬄine analysis of a time-of-check to time-of-use
race condition in the Linux kernel that could be exploited to compromise the
kernel. IntroVirt[11] explored using VM-level RnR to determine if systems
were previously exploited once zero-day attacks are discovered. Speck[13]
explored using a combination of OS-level speculation and program-level RnR
to remove security checks from the critical path of a program, and allow
multiple such checks to run in parallel. ParanoidAndroid [14] and Secloud [60]
explored the possibility of maintaining replicas of mobile devices in the cloud,
and then using program-level RnR to perform heavy analysis of the program
executions in the cloud.
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYZING RNR FRAMEWORKS AND
APPLICATIONS
In this chapter, we carry out a thorough analysis and evaluation on a virtual
machine level record and replay framework as well as its two major applica-
tions, i.e. replay with checkpointing and replay with VMI analysis. Efficient
checkpointing mechanism is commonly used together with RnR to support
fault-tolerant replication or provide initial consistent system state for de-
bugging. Various VMI analysis techniques are applied at replay stage to
oﬄoad heavyweight security checks from original execution, to monitor sys-
tem execution and conduct forensic analysis. The analysis in this Chapter is
based on the system design, and quantitative evaluation results are shown in
Chapter 5. With the major sources of overhead identified in different system
components, RnR developers can propose more efficient design accordingly.
This chapter first describes the overall design of “insight”, then follows a
detailed discussion of performance implications of each component.
3.1 RnR Framework
“Insight” [3] is a Qemu/Kvm based virtual machine record and replay frame-
work. By leveraging hardware-assisted virtualization technology, the baseline
system without RnR can achieve good performance for most workloads.
“Insight” adds the functionality of record and replay to Virtual Machine
Monitor by modifying Linux KVM hypervisor and the device emulator com-
ponent in QEMU. Figure 3.1 presents the architecture of “insight”, highlight-
ing the components modified by “insight” to a traditional virtual machine
monitor. Specifically, “Insight” configures VMCS(virtual machine control
structure) [62] to trigger VMExits on all these non-deterministic events, and
records or re-injects input values according to which mode it executes on. Ac-
cording to the origin of inputs, non-deterministic events can be categorized
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Figure 3.1: Insight Architecture
into three types: synchronous events, asynchronous events and combined
events. Different types of events vary in the amount of information required
to assist correct replay.
3.1.1 Synchronous Events
Synchronous events are triggered by instructions or functions executed by
the guest system, that will return non-deterministic results. For example,
read timer stamp counter(rdtsc) and get random number(rdrnd). More com-
plicated example is read programmed IO and memory mapped IO. The main
feature of such event is that even though it accesses non-deterministic data,
it is triggered by deterministic code. Therefore, synchronous events will be
faithfully reproduced, if replay follows the original execution path.
In “Insight”, VMCS is configured that rdtsc and rdrnd always trigger
VMExits into hypervisor. During record, the hypervisor logs the return
variable; while during replay, corresponding register or memory address is
overwritten with the logged variable.
3.1.2 Asynchronous Events
Asynchronous events are triggered by external devices to the guest system,
including interrupts from devices such as keyboard, mouse, disk etc., and up-
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dates to guest system memory from emulated devices via either NIC(network
interface card) or DMA. Since QEMU IO thread is running in parallel with
guest thread, asynchronous events need to be carefully scheduled and in-
jected to ensure being replayed at the exact same execution point, at which
the events occurred during record.
“Insight” uses 〈branch counter, instruction pointer, ECX value〉 as sys-
tem timestamp, which is an identical representation of program execution
point [57]. In record, asynchronous events as well as its timestmap is logged.
In replay, “Insight” leverages PMU (performance monitor unit) to trap the
the guest system into hypervisor at correct execution point. Concretely
speaking, the number of instructions to next asynchronous events injection
point is calculated as x, and the instruction counter is set up in a way that it
will overflow after executing x instructions. Meanwhile, VMCS is configured
that VMExit will be triggered once PMU counters overflow. Then in hy-
pervisor, the replay engine will regenerate the interrupts or update memory
using the logged values.
3.1.3 Combined Events
Combined events happen when an asynchronous event triggers execution
of certain functions or instructions in the guest system, leading to several
synchronous events. It is the common case for asynchronous events. For
example, on receiving an network packet, the NIC will generate an interrupt
and copy the content of the packets to the piece of memory address it maps
to. Later, the guest system is preempted and consume the packet by issuing
pio or mmio instructions. DMA-based disk IO event is another example.
Since synchronous events require much simpler logic in terms of both record
and replay, “Insight” deals with combined events efficiently by delaying the
asynchronous event until its following synchronous event.
We show the design details with an example of network traffic events han-
dling as following.
Network IO Events
Figure 3.2 shows a network IO example to illustrate different operations
applied during record and replay.
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Figure 3.2: Combined Events Example: Network IO Events
During record, 3 packets arrive consecutively before a MMIO event issued
from guest system. “Insight” modifies eepro100 virtual device driver that,
upon arrival of network packets, content of the packets (pkg1, pkg2 and pkg3
in this case) as well as the associated timestamps are recorded and saved to
logs. The order between the 3 packets is invisible to the guest system.
To ensure correct replay, the happens-before relationship between follow-
ing MMIO events and the receipt of network packets should be preserved.
During replay, as a normal synchronous event, the MMIO event will trap the
guest system into the hypervisor. In the hypervisor, before simply replaying
the MMIO event, number of undelivered network events are checked, pack-
ets content are retrieved from logs, and corresponding memory update are
applied. From guest’s perspective, the arrival of 3 packets and related state
updates are atomic operations during both record and replay.
3.2 RnR Applications
As an effective fault-tolerance solution, several virtual machine checkpointing
algorithms and mechanisms have been proposed, and micro-checkpointing
has been merged to the main stream of QEMU. A valid checkpointing is
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required to contain consistent cpu, memory and external device states so
that the replication can be later used for continuous execution.
Compared to general virtual machine checkpoints, the major difference
of replay checkpointing is that there is no need to freeze and save device
states, which simplifies checkpointing mechanism to some extent. All the
non-deterministic inputs from external devices are injected from replay logs
instead of QEMU emulated devices. The only exception is disk devices.
“Insight” leverages the Copy-On-Write (COW) based disk format provided
QEMU to avoid recording extremely huge amount of disk access return data.
All disk reads and writes are redirected from/to a temporary image file backed
by original disk image, which is created before system is booted up. In this
case, the initial sate of disk file is kept intact and can be used for multiple
numbers of replays. In addition, only disk access operations as well as their
timestamps need to be recorded, resulting in less log storage overhead.
To efficiently take checkpoints of the system memory, differential check-
points are commonly used if the checkpointing interval is around 10s of mil-
liseconds as follows.
• Guest virtual machine is suspended. Guest memory is set as write
protected.
• CPU state is copied to persistent storage as part of checkpointing and
a snapshot of disk image is created.
• After guest virtual machine is resumed, any write to memory page will
trigger write-protection fault. The accessed page will be copied to the
checkpointing and then reset to writable, so that later modification can
take effect.
There exists large variance in the size of memory checkpoints. The check-
point may only take several megabytes when the guest system is mostly idle
during that period. Note that it can go extremely large to several gigabytes,
which is close to the size of main memory, if heavy workloads actively execute.
3.3 Analysis of Overhead
In this section, we carry out a detailed analysis on record mode, replay mode
with checkpointing and VMI analysis one by one.
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3.3.1 Record Overhead
Compared to the baseline virtual machine execution, RnR adds three kinds
of overhead at the record side.
Firstly, in order to capture all non-deterministic inputs and log them within
hypervisor, RnR enforces guest virtual machine to generate extra VMExits,
which can be avoided with certain optimizations though. As discussed be-
fore, synchronous events, which return non-deterministic results, have to be
trapped into hypervisor, leading to the increase of VMExits.
For example, modern kvm leverages “kvmclock”, a paravirtualized clock
source, to enable rdtsc to obtain system-wide clock timer but only executing
within the guest system. Specifically, the guest system set up a range of
shared memory, and asks the hypervisor to write system clock timer to that
memory space at every VMEntry. Figure 3.3 illustrates execution time spent
in guest and hypervisor. We can see in baseline, rdtsc uses the value from
last VMEntry to compute system timer, leading to no VMExits. While, to
ensure deterministic replay, RnR has to record the return value of rdtsc. One
VMExit inevitably needs to be inserted at every read TSC instructions. Each
VMExit takes approximately 5000 cycles round trip, mainly due to context
switch between supervisor mode and guest mode.
The second overhead comes from log management, including log file write
operations. Generally file IO operations take relatively longer time than
computation and memory accesses, and will easily block on the critical path.
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To batch file writes and reduce the number of IO operations, “Insight” saves
log entries and network packets content to a pre-allocated in-memory buffer,
with adjustable size. File writes are only triggered when either the buffer is
full or complicated QEMU user space operation is required. Later evaluation
shows that it induces modest overhead for network non-intensive benchmarks.
The last component of overhead comes from the recording operation itself,
which is copy value from registers or memory to target buffer. This overhead
is ignorable, due to the lightweight memory copy operation it requires.
3.3.2 Replay Overhead
Deterministic replay enforces the guest system to repeat original execution
by repeating all non-deterministic inputs to the system from record and re-
inject them at the exact same point of execution. While in modern CPUs,
it is not trivial to determine the execution point of the guest system. As
discussed before, “Insight” utilizes the hardware performance counters to
implement accurate instruction counting logic. Unfortunately, the impreci-
sion of performance counter complicates the design and introduces significant
overhead.
The hardware performance monitor interface provides support to preempt
guest system execution when a certain performance event occurs, such as
counter overflow. Specifically, “Insight” intends to configure the PMU to
generate an interrupt when instruction retired counter overflows, and the
interrupt then causes VMExit in guest virtual machine, to transfer control
to the hypervisor. However, the deliver of performance counter interrupts can
be delayed for several to hundreds cycles depending on the type of machines.
To ensure replay correctness and robustness, a modified algorithm is designed
to tolerate such imprecision as follows. First the branch retired counter is
used instead of instruction counter, since the former one turns out to be
more reliable. The branch counter is configured to overflow early enough to
account for the non-deterministic length of delivery delay of the interrupt.
After receiving the interrupt, the guest machine is configured to VMExit in
a single-step way until the proper point of execution is reached.
As a result, a large number of VMExits are inserted to achieve precise
instruction count. Therefore replay overhead is closely related to the number
14
of asynchronous events during the execution.
Besides, the other overhead during replay is caused by file operations.
Similar buffer approach is applied to reduce the frequency of file operations
that large number of log entries are read together into in-memory buffer.
Thus log management takes small part in replay overhead.
Checkpointing Overhead
Efficient checkpointing (discussed in Section 3.2) implementation defers mem-
ory copying after virtual machine restart. It reduces the guest machine
downtime and enables parallel execution of guest code and memory copy-
ing operations. Performance overhead due to checkpointing comes from two
parts.
The first part is the overhead introduced during pre-copy stage. Before
memory copying, virtual machine is suspended. Meanwhile, all pages be-
long to guest virtual machine are set as write-protection, and snapshot of
disk image is taken. Different applications suffer similar amount of pre-copy
overhead.
The second part comes from the post-copy stage. After the guest virtual
machine is resumed, its execution is interrupted every time when memory
writes are issued to read-only pages, leading to write protection faults. These
software faults block the guest system execution until the copying of that
page is finished.
The amount of post-copy overhead depends on checkpointing frequency
and workload characteristics. On one hand, with longer checkpointing du-
ration, more dirty pages need to be saved to the checkpointing, leading to
higher checkpointing overhead. On the other hand, post-copy overhead varies
with different system workloads. If the system is idle or executes applications
with small memory footprint, checkpointing has relatively slight influence on
system performance, by benefiting from the parallel copy operations and in-
frequent write-protection faults. On the opposite, there will be relatively
higher performance deviation for systems running heavy workloads.
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VMI Analysis Overhead
In this thesis, we use synchronous VMI mechanism on commodity hardware
to detect violations of system security invariance. Compared to other asyn-
chronous mechanisms or approaches requiring hardware modifications, inline
checks provide a more consistent view of the whole system for analysis and
support both passive and active introspection. In spite of the higher perfor-
mance overhead caused by the synchronous mechanism, it is still reasonable
to be adopted in replay stage by oﬄoading heavy weight analysis out of the
execution critical path.
One restriction of VMI analysis in replay stage is that, the analysis should
not interfere the guest virtual machine state, leading to replay divergence.
Therefore only threat monitoring and verification are allowed. While Op-
erations such as killing malicious processes are disallowed. Applying VMI
analysis in replay introduces two kinds of overhead.
Firstly, common VMI analysis suffers from “semantic gap”, which re-
quires non-trivial techniques to reconstruct kernel data structures for anal-
ysis. Modern operating system is extremely complex, containing thousands
of different data structure types and a large number of instances of each
type. For example, a typical running instance of Linux kernel was found to
have 231 different types of data structures and 29,488 instances in total, to
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enable scheduling, memory management and IO support [63]. Before apply-
ing analyses accordingly, it is required to accurately extract data structures
information and correctly distinguish different system objects.
A simple operation, to retrieve the process id of current running process,
need to first locate task struct, the data structure for process descriptor, and
then retrieve the process id at the correct offset within the descriptor. More
complicated information retrieval operations may requires traversing several
nested structure pointers.
The other source of overhead comes from the extra VMExits enforced for
the introspection point of interest. Transient malwares violate security poli-
cies temporally, and may slip through the cracks between two consecutive
coarse-grained VMI checks. Therefore, hypervisor needs to enforce VMExits
upon execution of certain operations to capture useful sensitive informa-
tion of the system. Such introspection of interest is pretty useful to apply
vulnerability-specific verifications. In IntroVirt [11], Joshi et al listed exam-
ples of predicates to check buffer overflow, data race condition and missing
authentication. All these require security checks being applied at particu-
lar execution points and their corresponding memory states. VMExits are
inserted to transfer control to hypervisor.
In summary, Figure 3.4 illustrates different kinds of overhead introduced by
the RnR framework to the baseline system. On the record side, RnR causes
extra VMExits by disabling paravirtualization of certain instructions and
functions. Moreover, log management adds modest overhead due to time-
consuming file IO operations. On the replay side, the major overhead comes
from complex instruction counting logic, which is an essential component to
ensure deterministic replay. In addition, pre-copy and post-copy overhead
from checkpointing both slow down the guest virtual machine execution.
Virtual machine introspection further increases the number of VMExits in
replay. Meanwhile, another major overhad comes from the big effort paid to
“bridge the semantic gap” by reconstructing kernel data structures.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT SETUP
We evaluates the performance of our recording and replaying modes. For this,
we use Insight [3], a VM RnR tool based on a modified Linux KVM hypervisor
and modifed QEMU devices. Since the KVM hypervisor can leverage Intel
VTx extensions to virtualize the processor in hardware, the performance
numbers from this setup are representative of real-world machines. We do
not use Para-Virtualized (PV) drivers because they are Non-Deterministic
(ND).
Host machine
CPU: Xeon E3-64bit,4-cores,3.1GHz Memory: 8 Gbytes
OS: Ubuntu, Linux kernel 2.6.38-rc8
Guest machine
CPU: uniprocessor Memory: 1 Gbyte
OS: Debian, Linux kernel 3.19.0 Disk: 32 Gbytes
Table 4.1: System configuration for performance evaluation
Benchmark Parameters
apache -n100000 -c20
fileio
–file-total-size=6G –file-test-mode=rndrw
–file-extra-flags=direct –max-requests=10000
make linux-4.0 config with all-no
mysql
–test=oltp –oltp-test-mode=simple
–max-requests=500000 –table-size=4000000
radiosity -p1 -bf 0.005 -batch -largeroom
Table 4.2: Benchmarks executed
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4.1 Record and Replay Setup
We use the same record setup as “Insight” [3], and augment replay with two
functionality, i.e. checkpointing and VMI analysis. Our two replay setups
are discussed as follows.
4.1.1 Replay With Checkpointing
To evaluate the overhead of replay with checkpointing, we reuse the Linux
copy-on-write implementation used during fork system calls. Virtual memory
belonging to the VM is allocated within a user-space QEMU process running
on the host machine. By issuing “fork” system call on QEMU process, all
the memory belongs to that process, including guest system main memory,
is configured with copy-on-write.
4.1.2 Replay with VMI Analysis
Performance of VMI analysis is closely related with the frequency and com-
plexity of the analyses applied. The more frequent and complex analysis
triggeres higher overhead. We evaluate an analysis to list available processes
at every context switch boundary to understand their quantitative effect on
overall performance.
Unfortunately, current Intel VTx extensions do not support exiting on
specified guest execution point. Hence, to measure the performance impact
of replay with VMI analysis, we manually instrument Linux kernel source
code by inserting a debug exception before kernel context switches. The
debug exception is a single byte opcode (0xCC) used to trap instructions
by raising debug exceptions. The VMCS is configured to cause VMExits on
debug exceptions. The analysis itself takes approximately 106 cycles.
4.2 Time Measurement Mechanism
There are two instances of timer within virtualized platform, where one uses
physical clock source and is located in host operating system, and the other
is emulated by virtual machine monitor and mainly used by guest operating
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system. We use the host system wall clock timer to accurately measure exe-
cution time of the guest system. To ensure the timer is started and stopped
at the same system execution point, we manually insert debug interrupt be-
fore and after application execution and write a magic number into register
EAX. Meanwhile, the VMCS is configured to trap every debug interrupt into
hypervisor and the corresponding register value is checked whenever a debug
interrupt is received.
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CHAPTER 5
EVALUATION RESULTS
5.1 Record
The recording scheme records all non-deterministic inputs and generates the
log. In addition, it cannot use para-virtualization (PV). We call the scheme
Rec. Figure 5.1 compares Rec’s execution time to two other setups: no record-
ing with para-virtualization (PV) (NoRecPV) and no recording and no PV
(NoRecNoPV). The bars for each benchmark are normalized to NoRecNoPV.
We see that disabling PV increases the execution time of these benchmarks
by 25-150%. This is because we now have VMExits due to clock reads, disk
IO, and network activity. Apache and fileio are hit the most of the overhead,
while mysql is not impacted as it avoids disk accesses by caching recently-
accessed tables in memory. We need to record these events to be able to
replay deterministically.
Recording (Rec) takes, on average, 28% longer than NoRecNoPV. To un-
derstand their overhead sources, Figure 5.2 shows the slowdown of Rec over
NoRecNoPV and breaks it down into their sources, namely recording timer
reads (rdtsc), port and memory-mapped I/O accesses (pio/mmio), interrupts,
and network packet contents, and saving/restoring the RAS (RAS).
We see that the dominant overhead across all benchmarks is due to record-
ing rdtsc. This event occurs very frequently, especially in fileio and mysql,
where the application itself issues many timer reads to measure transaction
speed. In addition, fileio issues disk command and control signals using pio.
It also has DMA activity, which causes interrupt events to signal file access
completion. Apache receives network packets and uses mmio accesses to the
NIC to retrieve the packets. The more computation-intensive benchmarks
(make and radiosity) have little overhead. Finally, saving/restoring the RAS
induces only 4% overhead on average.
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Figure 5.1: Execution time of recording setups
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Figure 5.2: Breakdown of the Rec overhead over NoRecNoPV
Figures 5.3 show the input log generation rate for all our benchmarks. We
do not compress the data. We see that the rates are typically low. Apache
has the highest input log rate (4 MB/s) because it records packet contents.
5.2 Replay with Checkpoints
Figure 5.4 compares the execution time of various checkpointing replay setups
to recording (Rec). The replay setups use no checkpointing (RepNoChk) or
checkpoint every 5, 1, or 0.2 seconds (RepChk5, RepChk1, and RepChk02).
The bars are nomalized to Rec. From the data, we see that checkpointing
every 1 second (RepChk1) increases the execution time over Rec by 59%.
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Figure 5.4: Execution time of checkpointing replay setups
These results show that checkpointing replay runs at a speed that is
roughly comparable to that of recording. As a result, checkpointing replay
can be on all the time. While checkpointing replay is a bit slower, it can
catch up with recording because busy machines are rarely 100% utilized —
they are often waiting for multiple reasons. During that time, recording slows
down but replay can continue. If the replay gets significantly behind, we can
use backpressure to temporarily stall recorded execution.
The figure also shows that increasing or decreasing the checkpoint period
changes the speed a bit. Interestingly, even without checkpointing, replay
already takes on average 48% longer that Rec.
To understand these effects, Figure 5.5 shows again the slowdown of RepChk1
over Rec and breaks it down into their sources. The sources are those during
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Figure 5.5: Breakdown of the RepChk1 overhead over Rec
recording plus creating checkpoints (Chk).
The breakdown in the figure shows that creating checkpoints contributes
only modestly, on average, to the total overhead. This is why replaying
without checkpointing (RepNoChk) does not save much time over RepChk1.
The actual overhead depends on the memory write characteristics of work-
load; poor memory locality causes more page copies, increasing checkpointing
overhead.
Interestingly, we see that interrupt overhead dominates. The reason is that
interrupts are asynchronous events, while rdtsc, pio/mmio, and network are
synchronous. Identifying the instruction that should get the asynchronous
interrupt injected during replay is time consuming. As indicated in Sec-
tion ??, it requires single-stepping VMExits over several instructions. This
is the reason for the overhead of Figure 5.5.
5.3 Replay with VMI Analysis
Finally, Figure 5.6 compares the execution time of replay with VMI analysis
(RepVMI) to previously shown environments: checkpointing replay (RepChk1)
and recording (Rec). The bars are normalized to Rec. Replay with VMI anal-
ysis needs to trap on every context switch operation. Hence, the slowdown of
this mode directly relates to how many context switches were executed when
running specific workload. We see that replaying apache with VMI analysis
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Figure 5.6: Execution time of alarm replay
at context switch boundary takes 4x longer than recording them. For mysql,
it takes 16x. On the other hand, for filio, make, radiosity, with its modest
kernel activity, it is around 2x.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This thesis presents a detailed performance evaluation and analysis of vir-
tual machine level record and replay framework and its related applications.
Specifically, we evaluate 3 important modes in RnR, i.e. record, replay with
checkpointing and replay with VMI analysis. The latter two modes are two
representative usages of RnR.
According to our detailed analysis and quantitative results, record over-
head mainly comes from the extra number of VMExits, which is caused by
enforcing the guest virtual machine to trap into the hypervisor. It is necessary
to assist logging synchronous non-deterministic inputs. Replay overhead is
mostly caused by the complicated instruction counting logic, which is an es-
sential component to enable replay of non-deterministic events at the exactly
same system execution point as record. We find that accurate instruction
counting algorithm suffers significant performance overhead from the impre-
cision of interrupt delivery mechanism in performance monitor unit. We show
checkpointing overhead is closely related to the checkpointing frequency and
the workload characteristics. Moreover, for replay with VMI analysis, the
frequency and complexity are two major factors that affect overall perfor-
mance.
We hope our results can be useful for both RnR developers and users.
RnR developers can leverage our results to locate the major performance
bottlenecks in the system and accordingly propose more efficient design. RnR
users can have a more reasonable expectations of the system and customize
RnR applications in a more performance efficient way, by setting appropriate
checkpointing intervals or adjusting frequency of VMI analyses.
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